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III. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This appeal is taken from the trial court's memorandum ruling of May 9,2007 
and final order and judgment of June 7, 2007. This Court has jurisdiction over this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-103(2)(j). 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Must the Citi Appellees have an interest in the liened property to have 
standing to contest the validity of the Appellant Victor's lien? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The question of whether a given individual or 
association has standing to request a particular relief is primarily a question of law, 
although there may be factual findings that bear on the issue, an appellate court will 
review a question of law for correctness.1 An appellate court will review such factual 
determinations made by a trial court with deference.2 Because of the important policy 
considerations involved in granting or denying standing, an appellate court will 
closely review trial court determinations of whether a given set of facts fits the legal 
requirements for standing, granting minimal discretion to the trial court. Id. at 938, 
939. 
PRESERVATION BELOW: The Appellant Victor raised and argued the issue 
of the Citi Appellees's standing before the court below. R.256, 257. As well, unless 
1
 Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Wilkinson, 946 P.2d 372, 373 (Utah 1997). 
2
 State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994). 
1 
a party has standing a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a dispute. 
A lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time.3 "[Standing is a 
jurisdictional requirement that must be satisfied" before a court may entertain a 
controversy between two parties.4 " [T]he moving party must have standing to invoke 
the jurisdiction of the court."5 Under the traditional test for standing, "the interests 
of the parties must be adverse" and "the parties seeking relief must have a legally 
protectible interest in the controversy."6 
2. Did the Citi Appellees proffer competent evidence that they did not 
have timely actual knowledge of the commencement of Victor's lien action? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Whether an affidavit proffers facts establishing the 
elements necessary to prove a claim or defense is a matter of law which an appellate 
court reviews with no deference to the trial court's interpretation.7 
PRESERVATION BELOW: The Appellant raised this issue in its memorandum in 
support of its motion for new trial (R. 218-220, 258-264). 
3
 See Barnard v. Wassermann, 855 P.2d 243, 248 (Utah 1983). 
4
 Wash. County Water Conservancy Dist. v. Morgan, 2003 UT 58, P 6 n.2, 82 P.3d 
1125; accord Harris v. Springville City, 712 P.2d 188,190 (Utah 1986) ("[Ljack of 
standing is jurisdictional."); 
'Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Utah 1983) 
6
 Id. at 1148. 
7
 See Goodnow v. Sullivan, 2002 UT 21, UU7, 8. 
2 
3. Did the Citi Appellees meet their burden of production on their 
summary judgment claims? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Whether a trial court has properly granted 
summary judgment is a question of law which an appellate court will review for 
correctness, granting no deference to the trial court.* 
PRESERVATION BELOW: The Appellant raised this issue in its Rule 59 
motion ( R. 256-264) and at oral argument. 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. ORDINANCES. 
RULES AND REGULATIONS 
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules and regulations that 
pertain to this appeal are identified in the Table of Authorities and are fully set forth 
in the body of this brief or in the addendum to the brief. 
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Appellant Victor Plastering timely filed it lien action to enforce its lien for 
stucco work it had performed on the subject property, but did not file a lis pendens 
in relation to that lien action. It then filed an amended complaint and with that 
amended complaint commenced an in rem proceeding to declare its lien superior to 
the Appellee Citi Appellees's alleged mortgage on the liened property. The Citi 
Appellees answered, obtained a substitution of Citi Federal Savings Bank for Direct 
8
 See Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 922P. 2d 745 (Utah 1996). 
3 
Mortgage Corporation as a defendant and then moved for summary judgment against 
Victor. 
However, the Citi Appellees summary judgment papers were totally devoid of 
any claim that they had an interest in the liened property. The affidavits filed in 
support of that motion for summary judgment failed to allege any such interest and 
the Citi Defendants failed to argue that had any interest in the liened property. The 
supporting affidavits also failed to provide any factual foundation for their conclusion 
that the Citi Appellees were never provided with timely actual knowledge of the 
commencement of Victor's lien action. Victor moved to strike those affidavits but 
on the same day that Victor filed that motion the the trial court granted the Citi 
Appellees summary judgment, 
Victor then moved for a new trial and after further briefing and argument on 
that motion the trial court denied that motion. 
VI. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
April 13, 2004 The Appellant Victor timely filed an action to enforce its 
mechanic's lien against property in Utah County. Victor had 
stuccoed the house constructed on that property and had not been 
paid. R. 6. 
February 10, 2006 The trial court granted Victor leave to amend its complaint and 
4 
include in the amended complaint its in rem claims against 
Swanson's lien. R. 72 
August 21, 2006 The Appellee Citibank Federal Savings Bank answered Victor's 
amended complaint. R. 98 
Sept. 28, 2006 Citi Federal Savings Bank was substituted in as a defendant for 
Direct Mortgage Corporation. R. 125 
October 25, 2006 The Appellee Citimortgage, Inc. answered Victor's amended 
complaint. R. 132 
Nov. 17, 2006 The Citi Appellees moved for summary judgment but failed to 
allege they had any interest in the liened property. R.135, 170-
173. 
Nov. 17, 2006 The affidavits of Jim Beech (R. 142) and Wayne Flynn (R. 138) 
are filed. Neither affidavit provides any factual foundation for the 
legal conclusion their corporations did not have actual 
knowledge. 
January 16, 2007 Victor moved to strike the affidavits of Beech and Flynn 
(although this motion to strike was entered on the trial court's 
docket on January 18, 2007, it was filed on January 16, 2007). 
R.221 
5 
January 16, 2007 The trial court granted the Citi Appellees motion for summary 
judgment. R.213 
March 7,2007 Victor filed a motion for a new trial on the Citi Appellees motion 
for summary judgment, alleging that the court erred in granting 
summary judgment to the Citi Appellees because they had failed 
to allege an interest in the liened property, had failed to prove a 
lack of actual knowledge and had failed to meet their burden of 
production on summary judgment. R. 253, 266. 
April 16, 2007 Victor's motion is orally argued before the court. R. 394 
May 9, 2007 The court issued a memorandum ruling denying Victor's motion 
for new trial. R.402 
June 7, 2007 Judgment is entered in favor of the Citi Appellees. R.416 
June 8, 2007 Victor filed its notice of appeal. R.418 
VII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Regardless of whether any opposition is filed to a summary judgment motion, 
unless that motion "is made and supported as provided for by" by Rule 56 Ut. R. Civ. 
P. summary judgment cannot be entered against the non-moving party. At summary 
judgment the Citi Appellees failed to prove or argue they had an interest in the liened 
property. Victor's lien action was in rem against the Citi Appellees and unless they 
had an interest in the liened property they could not show a distinct and palpable 
injury that gave them an interest in contesting Victor's claim to lien priority. Having 
a right to appear in an in rem action is different than a right to defend on the merits 
and unless the Citi Appellees had something at stake in the in rem lien action they had 
no standing to contest Victor's lien claims. Because the Citi Appellees failed to make 
any showing of an interest in the liened property the trial court erred in granting them 
summary judgment. 
As well, the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11(2) only benefit persons 
with an interest in the liened property. Unless a peison has an interest in the liened 
property, they have no standing to invoke the lis pendens requirements of § 38-1-
11(2). The Citi Appellees failed to show they had an interest in the liened property 
and thus excluded themselves from asserting the requirements of § 38-1-11(2) against 
Victor. 
Finally, regardless of whether the Citi Appellees could put the issue of timely 
actual knowledge of the commencement of Victor's lien action into issue at summary 
judgment, they failed to proffer competent evidence on the issue of timely actual 
knowledge. Although at trial Victor bears the burden of proof on the issue of actual 
knowledge, at summary judgment the Citi Appellees bear the initial burden of 
producing evidence showing they did not have timely actual knowledge. The Beech 
7 
and Flynn affidavits are conclusory in the extreme and provide no supporting factual 
foundation for their legal conclusion that the Citi Appellees did not have timely actual 
knowledge of the commencement of Victor's lien action. Without that factual 
foundation it is impossible for a trier of fact to determine whether the evidence is 
competent; that is, relevant, material and otherwise admissible. And by reciting only 
that they did not have "actual knowledge" the Citi Appellees legal conclusion tells 
the reader nothing about what the affiants mean by "actual knowledge." At summary 
judgment a trial court is not capable of weighing conflicting inferences on material 
issues ot tact, and the trial court erred in finding that the Beech and Flynn affidavits 
provided competent evidence. 
Because the Citi Appellees lacked standing to contest Victor's in rem lien 
claims on the merits, lacked standing to invoke the lis pendens requirements of § 38-
1-11(2) and failed to proffer competent evidence on the issue of timely actual 
knowledge, the trial court erred in granting the Citi Appellees summary judgment and 
Victor is entitled to a reversal of that judgment, and an award of its attorney fees 
before this Court and the court below. 
VIII. ARGUMENT 
A. The Citi Appellees must have an interest in the liened property to 
have standing to contest the validity of the Appellant Victor's lien. 
In their summary judgment motion the Citi Appellees's entirely failed to make 
8 
any assertion that they had a legal or equitable interest in the property which was the 
subject of Victor's lien action. R. 135,137,141,157, 160-173. Unless they have an 
interest in the subject property they have no standing to contest the priority of 
Victor's lien. 
i. Unless They Have An Interest In The Liened Property The Citi 
Appellees Cannot Invoke The Actual Knowledge Requirement of 
§38-1-11(2). 
The Citi Appellees cannot look to Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11(2) for statutory 
standing, because it only requires the recording of "a notice of the pendency of the 
action, in the manner provided in actions affecting the title or right to possession of 
real property . . ."9 Unless the Citi Appellees had an interest in the subject property 
which could affect "the title or right to possession of [that] real property," the Citi 
Appellees were not within the class of persons the lis pendens requirement of § 38-1-
11(2) was intended to benefit, which means that by failing to prove they had an 
interest in the subject property the Citi Appellees failed to show that they had 
standing to claim the benefit of that lis pendens requirement. 
In Projects Unlimited v. Copper State Thrift & Loan Co.10 the Utah Supreme 
Court specifically found that § 38-1-11(2) was only intended to give notice to persons 
9
 Utah Code Ann. §38-1-11(2). 
10
 798 P.2d 738 (Utah 1990). 
9 
with an interest in the liened property: 
By contrast, it follows logically, timely recordation of the lis pendens 
imparts constructive notice to all persons concerned with the property 
of the action to enforce the lien, see Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-2(1989), 
regardless of whether they were named as parties or had actual 
knowledge of the action, [emphasis added] 
Thus, unless the Citi Appellees are within the class of persons which can invoke the 
lis pendens requirements of § 38-1-11(2), whether or not they had actual knowledge 
of Victor's lien action is irrelevant to whether Victor could proceed with its lien 
action against the Citi Appellees. 
The Projects court's specific reference to Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-2,11 which 
provides for the filing of a lis pendens, confirms that at the time that Victor served the 
Citi Appellees they could not invoke the lis pendens requirements of § 38-11-1(2) 
unless they had an interest in the liened property. Section 78-40-2 states, in part, that 
"a purchaser or encumbrancer of the property affected thereby shall be deemed to 
have constructive notice of the pendency of the action," confirming that its provisions 
are intended to benefit only persons with an interest in the property against which the 
lis pendens is filed. 
Admittedly, where it is established that a person has an interest in the subject 
property and that person challenges Victor's lien, § 38-1-11(3) imposes the burden 
11
 Amended and re-codified as Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-1303. 
10 
of proof upon Victor at trial to show actual knowledge. But if, as the Citi Appellees 
urge, the scope of § 38-1-11(2) is broadened to include persons without an interest 
in the subject property, a lien claimant's action would be subject to intervention by 
any stranger to the property who cared to intervene and challenge the action. 
For example, suppose a case where a mechanic's lien action is timely 
commenced but without the filing of a lis pendens. In that case, can a stranger with 
no interest in the real property at issue intervene in the action pursuant to § 38-1-13-
by asserting that the lien holder did not file a lis pendens and that the stranger never 
had actual knowledge on a timely basis of the mechanic's lien action? According to 
the Citi Appellees's construction of § 38-1-11(2), because that stranger never had 
actual knowledge, they would have statutory standing to intervene in the mechanic's 
lien to have it declared void as to them. 
Of course, the first question that occurs is whether § 38-1-11(2) was intended 
to benefit persons with no interest in the subject property, thus providing the world 
with standing to challenge a mechanic's lien that has not been perfected by filing a 
lis pendens. Only if the Citi Appellees's construction of § 38-1-11(2) is adopted does 
the stranger in the above example have standing under § 38-1-13 to intervene. 
The glaring problem with such a construction is that it makes nugatory the 
requirement that a lis pendens be recorded so that notice is provided to persons with 
11 
an interest affecting the title or right to possession of that real property. Instead, the 
lis pendens requirement is read down to requiring only the recording of a notice of 
a pendency of the action. Under the Citi Appellees's reading as soon as any person 
that did not have an interest in the real property (typically all persons in the State of 
Utah excepting those few persons with liens or other interests in a particular 
residential property) learned of an unperfected lien action, they could intervene and 
move to void the unperfected lien as against them. Even if. the lien holder 
immediately conceded that the lien was void as against the stranger, the lien holder 
would still be liable for the successful mtervenor's attorney fees incurred to file the 
motion to intervene. Unless it was the intent of the legislature to open the court's 
doors to intermeddlers and vexatious claims, the Citi Appellees's construction cannot 
be the construction applied to § 38-1-11(2). 
ii. Without An Interest In The Liened Property the Citi 
Appellees Lacked Standing To Contest On The Merits 
Victor's Lien Claims. 
The Citi Appellees's inability to prove any adverse effect from Victor's lien 
action is key to showing that under Utah law Citi Appellees lacked standing to seek 
relief under § 11(2). Unlike the federal judiciary which is constrained by the Article 
III case or controversy clause, in determining whether a litigant has standing Utah 
courts focus on the separation of powers doctrine. Standing is a concept ffrooted in 
12 
the historical and constitutional role of the judiciary" as one of three separate and 
equal branches of government.12 Moreover, "the question of whether a given 
individual or association has standing to request a particular relief is primarily a 
question of law, although there may be factual findings that bear on the issue."13 
Under the traditional test for standing, a litigant must demonstrate a "particularized" 
injury, which in a lien action can only occur if the named defendant has an interest 
in the property.14 
In Utah foreclosure proceedings are in rem15 and the question then arises of 
how it is that Citi Appellees, which had no interest in the subject property, can 
demonstrate a particularized injury. As to in rem proceedings, the Utah Supreme 
Court has approved the classification employed by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
addressing in rem jurisdiction: 
As explained in n. 17 of Shaffer, the Supreme Court there chose to use 
the term "in rem" to describe both in rem and quasi in rem jurisdictions. 
In quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1283, 78 
S. Ct. 1228, n. 12 (1958), the Shaffer Court did acknowledge the 
distinctions in these types of jurisdiction. That quote from Hanson 
12
 Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d at 1149. 
13
 Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Wilkinson, 946 P.2d 372, 373 (Utah 1997). 
uSoc'y of Prof I Journalists v. Bullock, 743 P.2d 1166, 1170 (Utah 1987). 
15
 See P.LE. Employees Fed Credit Union v. Bass, 759 P.2d 1144, FN4 (Utah 
1988) where the court ruled: "A proceeding to foreclose upon a mortgage is considered an 
action in rem or quasi in rem under Utah law. (citations omitted)." 
13 
stated: 
A judgment in rem affects the interests of all persons in 
designated property. A judgment quasi in rem affects the interests of 
particular persons in designated property. The latter is of two types. In 
one the plaintiff is seeking to secure a pre-existing claim in the subject 
property and to extinguish or establish the nonexistence of similar 
interests of particular persons. In the other the plaintiff seeks to apply 
what he concedes to be the property of the defendant to the satisfaction 
of a claim against him. Restatement, Judgments, 5-9.ffl6 
Victor's action against other persons that had or might have an interest in the subject 
property was of the first type of quasi in rem proceeding identified in the passage 
horn Hanson v. Denckla17 just quoted. 
Because the proceeding below was in rem Victor merely sought the 
adjudication of the rights (if any) of particular persons in the subject property and did 
not claim any personal relief against any of the possible lien holding defendants. 
Because this was an in rem proceeding, merely being named as a party defendant did 
not provide the Citi Appellees with standing to contest Victor's lien claims on the 
merits.18 There was no requirement that Citi Appellees appear and defend on the 
16Rhoades v. Wright, 622 P.2d 343, 345 (Utah 1980). 
17
 357 U.S. 235, 246 (1958). 
18
 Cf. United States v. 148,840.00 in United States Currency, 521 F.3d 1268, 1273 
(10th Cir. 2008) where the court ruled that at the summary judgment stage of an in rem 
proceeding a party making claim to the property in issue must "prove by a preponderance 
of the evidence that he has a facially colorable interest in the res such that he would be 
injured i f deprived of his property interest. Of course, the Citi-Appellees have entirely 
failed to prove they have an interest in the liened property. 
14 
merits against Victor's claim. And even when the Citi Appellees chose to appear, 
because they had no interest in the subject property they could have no proper interest 
in defending against Victor's lien claims, but only in advising the court that they had 
no interest in the subject property and that they were was not contesting Victor's 
claims. 
To have standing under the traditional test Citi Appellees must have shown that 
they incurred a "distinct and palpable injury" by alleging that they suffered or will 
"sufferf] some distinct and palpable injury that gives [it] a personal stake in the 
outcome of the legal dispute."10 The legal dispute between Victor and the Citi 
Appellees in this case concerns the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11(2). The 
Citi Appellees entirely failed to prove or argue in their summary judgment papers that 
they would suffer some distinct and palpable injury if the requirements of § 11(2) 
were not enforced against Victor. Moreover, the Citi Appellees in their summary 
judgment papers entirely failed to prove or argue that they had an interest in the 
liened property, which conclusively foreclosed any finding by the trial court that the 
Citi Appellees suffered a distinct and palpable injury because of a lack of timely 
actual knowledge of the commencement of Victor's lien action. 
Jenkins, 675 P.2d at 1148 (Utah 1983). 
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B. The Affidavits of Flynn and Beech Fail to Prove the Citi Appellees 
Did Not Have Timely Actual Knowledge of Victor's Lien Action. 
Before the trial court the Citi Appellees's proffered the affidavits of Wayne 
Flynn20 and Jim Beech21 in support of their claim that the Citi Appellees did not have 
timely actual knowledge. But neither of those affidavits provide the proof required 
by law. Both affidavits are in a conclusory form and under prevailing case law do not 
meet the requirements of Rule 56(e).22 But even if, for the sake of argument, those 
affidavits are deemed admissible as evidence, neither of them disposes of the issue 
of actual knowledge. 
i. The Conclusory Affidavits of Beech and Flynn Are Devoid of 
Factual Foundation And Create Conflicting Inferences On 
Material Facts. 
20
 R. 138. 
21
 R. 142. 
22
 See Murdoch v. Springville Mun. Corp. (In Re General Determination of Water 
Rights), 1999 UT 39,1126, where the court reviewed the requirement of Rule 56(e) and 
Utah law on this issue: 
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, 
shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show 
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated 
therein. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). These requirements mirror those that apply to 
all evidence, and our case law on excluding affidavit evidence supports this. 
See, e.g., Treloggan v. Treloggan, 699 P.2d 747, 748 (Utah 1985) (affidavit 
based on unsubstantiated belief insufficient); Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 
857, 859 (Utah 1983) (conclusory affidavits are invalid); GNS Partnership 
v. Fullmer, 873 P.2d 1157, 1164-65 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (affidavits not 
based on personal knowledge were properly stricken). 
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As to actual knowledge of persons at Direct Mortgage Corporation Mr. Beech 
first avers that he did not have actual knowledge and then finishes with the entirely 
conclusory statement that: 
Neither affiant nor any other officer or agent of Direct Mortgage 
Corporation had actual knowledge of the existence of the above-
captioned litigation prior to June 14, 2006. R. 137, 11 3. 
After reading the Beech affidavit the reader knows no more about whether Direct 
Mortgage Corporation had timely actual knowledge than if Mr. Beech had stated "I 
deny that Direct Mortgage Corporation had actual knowledge of Victor's lien 
litigation prior to Direct Mortgage Corporation being served with process in Victor's 
lien action." 
Mr. Beech's affidavit is insufficient as proof of a lack of actual knowledge 
because it: 
i. fails to disclose when Mr. Beech attained his status as an officer of the Direct 
Mortgage Corporation (DMC). Did he become President of DMC after April 13, 
2004? After June 14, 2006? Although while an officer of DMC he is deemed to have 
personal knowledge of DMC s operations within the scope of his duties, the reader 
has no way of knowing whether Mr. Beech was an officer of DMC during the first 
180 days after April 13,2004. Mr. Beech's failure to disclose these foundational facts 
leaves the reader to reasonably infer one of these conflicting assumptions, either of 
17 
which is reasonable. 
ii. fails to advise the reader whether the officers and agents referred to include 
those employed prior to June 14, 2006. Is Mr. Beech speaking only of officers and 
agents while he has been President? Of officers and agents only presently employed 
by DMC? He doesn't say, which leaves the reader to infer one of these conflicting 
alternatives, any one of which is reasonable. 
iii. fails to advise the reader of DMC's operations, functions and transactions 
giving rise to an interest in the liened property or of Mr. Beech's duties or functions 
within DMC. Is DMC a mere holding company for a subsidiary which in fact 
conducted all the operations and transactions relating to the liened property? If so, 
this would probably preclude Mr. Beech and DMC's officers and agents from, in the 
normal course, acquiring actual knowledge of the commencement of Victor's lien 
action. Instead, it would be the officers and agents of the subsidiary that would have 
the capacity to acquire actual knowledge. Is any such subsidiary an agent of DMC? 
Because Mr. Beech does not describe DMC's operations and transactions in relation 
to the liened property, we have no way of knowing. Did DMC even have an interest 
in the liened property when Victor filed its lien action? Mr. Beech does not say. If 
not, had DMC sold its interest and was the person that the DMC mortgage had been 
sold to tracking legal actions in relation to the liened property? From the fact that Mr. 
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Beech fails to aver that DMC had an interest in the liened property, fails to describe 
DMC's operations and transactions which gave rise to an interest in the liened 
property, and fails to describe his job duties; the reader could reasonably infer that 
DMC was a stranger to the liened property and so did not qualify for notice of 
Victor's pending lien action. 
iv. fails to advise the reader whether the officers and agents of DMC routinely 
reported such lien action information to Mr. Beech, or whether Mr. Beech's 
knowledge is based on some other DMC information system. Is Mr. Beech assuming 
that because no officer or agent of DMC reported the Victor lien action to Mr. Beech, 
none of them had actual knowledge? If DMC does not maintain information systems 
to capture this type of lawsuit data, was there some reporting system in place so that 
any officer or agent that learned of Victor's lien action would report such information 
to Mr. Beech? If not, was inquiry made of the officers and agents of DMC? Did they 
respond to that inquiry by affirmatively stating that they were never advised of the 
commencement of Victor's lien action or did they merely say they couldn't 
remember? Mr. Beech's conclusory affidavit compels the reader to choose among 
these conflicting inferences on the issue of actual knowledge. 
v. fails to advise the reader whether on or after April 13, 2004 DMC had 
information systems in place to capture information relating to the commencement 
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of lawsuits naming DMC as a party defendant. Because Mr. Beech makes no mention 
of such systems, the reader can reasonably infer that DMC did not have such systems 
in place and that Mr. Beech, in effect, is simply asserting that he does not have any 
information showing that DMC acquired actual knowledge. This is far different from 
a particularized assertion that actual knowledge was never acquired. 
vi. fails to advise the reader whether prior to June 14, 2006 the DMC 
information systems did in fact capture information regarding Victor's lien action. It 
is entirely possible that a clerical employee, who was not an agent or officer of DMC, 
routinely entered such information into DMC5s data processing system and that the 
responsible officer or agent failed to take proper notice of that information. The 
reader is left to speculate whether this was or was not the case. 
vii. fails to explain what the term actual knowledge means. Actual knowledge 
is a legal term and there is no evidence Mr. Beech is an attorney versed in the 
requirements of § 38-1-11(2). Does Mr. Beech mean that DMC must have written 
notice? Does he mean that a lack of actual knowledge refers to fact that there is no 
data entry on DMC's information systems showing that within 180 days of April 13, 
2004 DMC knew that Victor's lien action had been commenced? Does he mean that 
he inquired of the persons at DMC responsible for lien actions in which DMC has an 
interest and that none of them could remember? Again, Mr. Beech's failure to lay any 
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factual foundation for his conclusory statement as to actual knowledge invites 
numerous conflicting inferences. 
Although Wayne Flynn is employed by Citibank, an entity separate from DMC, 
Mr. Flynn's cursory statement on actual knowledge is, excepting for the substitution 
of Citibank and a different date, identical to that of Mr. Beech: 
Neither Affiant nor any other officer or agent of Citibank had actual 
knowledge of the existence of the above-captioned litigation prior to 
June 16, 2006. R. 141,113. 
Accordingly, the Flynn affidavit suffers from the same defects as the Beech affidavit. 
Although the general rule is that corporate otlicers are presumed to have 
personal knowledge of the facts to which they attest,23 this only means that a 
corporate officer need not testify regarding the sources and means of his knowledge. 
But he must still testify as to what it is that he knows. At summary judgment a 
corporate officer must nevertheless testify with sufficient particularity to remove 
ambiguity regarding what it is that he is saying. 
For example, suppose a case of a fraudulent use of an appraisal to over-finance 
a property. Although the summary judgment affidavit of a corporate officer 
responsible for a mortgage company's real estate financing transactions would not 
need to specify the sources and means (i.e., the particular documents and employees 
23
 See Utah Farm Prod, Credit Ass'n v. Watts, 131 P.2d 154 (Utah 1987) quoting 3 
Am. Jur. 2d Affidavits § 5 (1986); cf. Rule 602 URE. 
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providing him with information) by which he acquired knowledge of that fraudulent 
transaction, he must still particularize the facts supporting fraud.24 It would not be 
enough for him to aver only that: "Ace appraisal colluded with putrid purchaser and 
salacious seller to overstate the appraisal, which resulted in the mortgage company 
over-financing the property by 30%. The appraiser, the purchase and the seller then 
split the excess loan proceeds three ways." Such a conclusory averment provides no 
facts disposing of the issues this conclusory statement raises. 
Restated, a corporate officer's presumption of personal knowledge cannot 
dispose of the requirement that he specifically aver to the facts establishing the 
occurrence of the actual transaction in issue.25 Clearly, the presumption of personal 
knowledge does not remove the requirement that a corporate officer attest to facts 
sufficient to establish the relevance26 and admissibility of the corporate officer's 
evidence.27 
24
 Cf. Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 104 (Utah 1992) (ruling that even an 
expert's affidavit must include not only the expert's opinion, but also specific facts 
logically supporting the expert's conclusion). 
25
 In criminal law, this would be proof of the commission of the actus reus. 
26
 See URE 401 which states: "'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of 
the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." 
27
 3 Am. Jur 2d § 5, FN3 (2003); see also URE 402 which states in part: "Evidence 
which is not relevant is not admissible." 
22 
Further, the presumption of personal knowledge cannot operate where 
"conflicting inferences material to the outcome of the case can be drawn from the 
facts/'28 because at summary judgment there is no way for a trial court to weigh the 
evidence and determine which of those conflicting inferences is entitled to the 
presumption of personal knowledge. In Goodnow v. Sullivan29 the Utah Supreme 
Court considered the inferences drawn by a trial court in relation to a letter in which 
the settlor of a trust stated that she did not want the defendant to '"have control over 
my property after my death.'" After observing that: 
"As a successor trustee, defendant would not have full control over her 
mother's property. The 'control' would be shared with plaintiff,"30 
the Court then dealt with the unresolved fact questions this generic use of the word 
"control" raised: 
"The question then arises regarding what Mrs. Morrison meant by 
'control.' Was it full control or only partial control? Again, actual 
questions of fact are presented."31 
After finding that this generic usage raised questions of fact, the Court then 
held that: 
Goodnow v. Sullivan, 2002 UT 21,1113. 
2002 UT at 1112. 
Id. 
Id. (citation omitted) 
23 
Various conflicting inferences material to the outcome of the case can 
be drawn from the facts. The judge "may not on a motion of summary 
judgment, draw fact inferences as to [the moving party's] purpose or 
intention.. . . Such inferences may only be drawn at trial.1132 
Applied to the case sub judice, it is evident that the Beech and Flynn affidavits leave 
unresolved numerous conflicting inferences material to the outcome of this case. 
A primary question the Beech and Flynn affidavits leave unresolved is what do 
they mean by "actual knowledge." Because they are not lawyers versed in Utah law, 
they are not competent to testify whether their respective corporations, in the legal 
sense, had actual knowledge.33 Instead, they must testify to those specific events or 
transactions which provided their respective corporations with knowledge that they 
had not acquired or been informed of the commencement of Victor's lien action.34 
Again, although their personal knowledge is presumed so that they do not need state 
the sources and means by which they acquired knowledge of those events or 
transactions, they must still testify as to particular corporate actions which provided 
32
 2002 UT 21,1113. 
33
 See Harper v. Summit County, 963 P.2d 768, 774 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) where 
this Court rejected as insufficient a legal conclusion in an affidavit: 
"However, this affidavit merely states the legal conclusion that the facility 
is an accessory use, and as such was exempt from the Development Code's 
building permit requirements. It does not set forth specific facts to support 
this bare legal conclusion and, therefore, fails to show that there is a 




their respective corporations with knowledge they had never acquired or received 
information regarding the commencement of Victor's lien action. 
If a court is to assess the admissibility of a witness's testimony, that witness 
must state sufficient facts to allow a court to assess and weigh the probative value of 
the evidence (i.e. its relevance). Unless the affidavit of a corporate officer at least 
facially provides some relevant evidence, there is no evidence on which to found 
summary judgment. A bare conclusion by a purported witness unsupported by 
reference to any facts to support that conclusion, is by definition entirely irrelevant 
and cannot dispose of a material fact in issue.35 
ii. There Is No Evidence The Citi Appellees Had Any Way 
Of Knowing Whether They Timely Acquired Actual 
Knowledge Of The Lien Action. 
In K & T, Inc. v. Koroulis the Utah Supreme Court overturned summary 
judgment because the conclusory affidavit of the moving party's officer was found 
to be insufficient to dispose of the issue of actual knowledge.36 At issue was a 
provision of the Utah Code which provides that "[a] restriction on transfer of a 
security imposed by the issuer" is ineffective against any person without actual 
35
 SeeAlbrecht v. Uranium Services, Inc., 596 P.2d 1025, 1026 (Utah 1979); see 
also Bank of Ephraim v. Davis, 581 P.2d 1001, 1004 (Utah 1978). 
36
 888 P.2d 623 (Utah 1994). 
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knowledge unless the restriction is conspicuously noted on the security. 
The party moving for summary judgment in Koroulis, Montana Brand, failed 
to meet its summary judgment burden of establishing it did not have actual 
knowledge. Its corporate secretary, Maxfield, averred in his affidavit that "[no one] 
at Montana Brand was informed of the existence of the Consent Agreement or the 
Stockholders1 Agreement by personnel from First Security [Bank]." In construing 
this "carefully tailored affidavit" the court found its did not support summary 
judgment because, even though it was coupled with the admission by the non-moving 
party Koroulis "that he had never informed Montana Brand about the restiiction" it 
did not "foreclose the possibility that Montana Brand acquired actual knowledge of 
the restrictions from some other source."38 
In denying summary judgment, the court explicitly ruled that unless Montana 
Brand, as the moving party, met its initial burden of showing that there were no 
disputed issues of material fact, "the party opposing the motion is under no obligation 
to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue for trial."39 The moving party's failure 
to meet its initial burden meant that the non-moving parties "were under no obligation 
37
 Utah Code Ann. § 70A-8-204. 
38




to come forward with specific facts showing that there was a genuine issue for trial" 
In addressing the very issue disputed in this case, which is actual knowledge 
of the party moving for summary judgment, Koroulis represents a specific finding 
that the party moving for summary judgment failed to prove it did not have actual 
knowledge; that is, it failed to prove a negative. In reality, such issues do not really 
require proof of a negative, but require affirmative proof of regular procedures to 
acquire or receive information. 
Professor Wigmore provides considerable instruction on how such proof is to 
be provided. The Citi Appellees must describe those events or transactions which 
provided them with sufficient opportunity to capture information regarding the 
commencement of Victor's lien action within the first 180 days of its 
commencement.41 Unless the Citi Appellees have testified to facts showing that they 
would have captured this information had it been provided to them,42 they have not 
disposed of the issue of actual knowledge. 
Professor Wigmore states that the admissibility of this negative fact evidence 
turns on whether the witness had sufficient exposure to events so "that in the ordinary 
Id. 
2 Wigmore, Evidence § 653 (Chadbourn rev. 1979). 
2 Wigmore, Evidence § 664 (Chadbourn rev. 1979). 
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course of events he would have heard or seen the fact had it occurred." Consistent 
with this rule, our courts require that the witness lay adequate foundation to show 
what the ordinary course of events were for that witness.44 In the real estate mortgage 
context, this would necessarily require disclosure of the nature of the corporation's 
mortgage and recording transactions, its record keeping systems employed to capture 
or acquire information, whether those information systems were operating during the 
time in question and whether they were designed to capture the type of information 
in issue. 
Although there are no Utah cases directly on point, Curtis v. Harmon 
Electronics, Inc.45 quotes Hudson v. Union Pacific R.R.46 for the rule that: 
All that need appear is that the witness was so situated in relation to the 
train at the time it is claimed the warnings were given that said warnings 
would have awakened her attention to them. [The witness] was in a 
position where it is likely that she would have heard the whistle, or at 
least the bell, and as there is no evidence that her attention was so 
absorbed in other matters that she would not have heard, a jury question 
is presented. 




 See GlencoreLtd. v. Ince, 972 P.2d 376, 381 (Utah 1998) (where the court held 
that to provide evidence of what constituted the ordinary course of business, a party must 
provide evidence of its business practices). 
45
 575 P.2d 1044,1047 (Utah 1978). 
46
 233 P.2d 357, 360 (Utah 1951). 
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show that during the first 180 days after April 13, 2004 their record keeping systems 
would have captured any information received regarding the commencement of 
Victor's lien action against other encumbrancers on the liened property, that those 
record keeping systems were properly functioning during that time, and that within 
the first 180 days after April 13, 2004 those record keeping systems did not capture 
any information regarding the commencement of Victor's lien action. 
As it stands now, the conclusory statements of actual knowledge in the Beech 
and Flynn affidavits are just as consistent with the inference that the Citi Appellees 
do not have any way of knowing whether the Citi Appellees acquired information 
within the first 180 days regarding the commencement of Victor's lien action, as they 
are with the inference that the Citi Appellees had systems in place which would have 
within the first 180 days acquired that lien action information had it been provided 
to them, but that their systems did not acquire any such information. The first 
inference is, in effect, that the Citi Appellees do not know whether they timely 
acquired information on Victor's lien action. The second inference is that the Citi 
Appellees know for a fact that timely information regarding the commencement of 
Victor's lien action was not provided to them. 
Because these two inferences conflict, because both are material to the outcome 
of this case, and because both inferences can be drawn from the conclusory averments 
of Beech and Flynn, there was no evidence before the trial court at summary 
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judgment from which it could properly infer a lack of actual knowledge by the Citi 
Appellees. The trial court could only find that the affidavits of Beech and Flynn were 
sufficient by selecting one conflicting inference over the other, which requires 
weighing the evidence. Under the holding stated in Goodnow,41 at summary judgment 
it was error for the trial court to make these adverse inferences against Victor. 
C. The Citi Appellees Did Not Meet Their Burden Of Production for 
Summary Judgment Against Victor's Lien Claims. 
The burden of production on summary judgment is different than the burden 
of proof at trial. At trial a plaintiff presents its case in chief and if at the close of that 
case if it fails to present a prima facie case, the defendant is entitled to a directed 
verdict. But where a defendant is moving for summary judgment a case presents a 
fundamentally different procedural posture because it is the defendant, as the moving 
party, which must first produce proof sufficient to negate the plaintiffs claims against 
the defendant. Regardless of whether a summary judgment motion is opposed, unless 
the party moving for summary judgment under Rule 56 presents a prima facie case 
supporting its claim to summary judgment, summary judgment is improper.48 
47
 2002 UT at 1113. 
48
 See Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co.. 922P. 2d 745 (Utah 1996) where the 
court ruled: "We find that the manner in which these affidavits were presented 
provided an insufficient factual basis for the district court's ruling. Ordinarily, the 
opponent to a summary judgment motion must "set forth specific facts showing 
that there is a genuine issue for trial." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). However, that burden 
is triggered only when "a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as 
30 
In this case, a key element of the Citi Appellees summary judgment claim was 
never proven by the Citi Appellees because they failed to prove that they had an 
interest in the liened property. R. 135,137,141,157, 160-173. If the Citi Appellees 
had no interest in the subject property, they had no case for opposing Victor's claim 
that its lien was entitled to priority over the Citi Appellees's alleged encumbrance on 
the property. 
Because the Citi Appellees had no interest in the liened property the only party 
with a litigation interest regarding Citi Appellees's alleged encumbrance was Victor. 
As explained above, it had an interest in rem to declare Citi Appellees \s lien inferior 
to Victor's. 
Proof that the Citi Appellees had an interest in the liened property was critical 
to their case for summary judgment. In particular, without the predicate showing of 
provided in this rule." Id. (emphasis added). "Unless the moving party meets its 
initial burden to present evidence establishing that no genuine issue of material 
fact exists, 'the party opposing the motion is under no obligation to demonstrate 
that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 445 (Utah 
1996) (quoting K&T, Inc. v. Koroulis, 888 P.2d 623, 628 (Utah 1994)). The 
Madsen affidavit failed to negate any disputed issue regarding the impact of the 
change in diversion points on the private wells. Whatever expertise Madsen had 
acquired as an irrigator, it was not plainly pertinent to the question of impact on 
water tables; nor did he provide any foundational facts supporting his opinion. 
See, e.g., King v. Searle Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 832 P.2d 858, 864 n.2 (Utah 1992) 
("Affidavits of experts are insufficient.. . unless foundational facts are set forth 
supporting their opinions and conclusions."). Rather, he simply asserted in 
conclusory fashion that movement of water upstream could not impact the water 
table near plaintiffs' wells. 
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an interest in the property Citi Appellees could not even get to the issue of whether 
Victor could show that Citi Appellees had actual knowledge of Victor's lien action. 
As has already been shown, unless they had an interest in the liened property they had 
no standing to pursue relief under § 38-1-11(2), and any failure by Victor to file a lis 
pendens was not something which provided the trial court with jurisdiction to grant 
summary judgment to the Citi Appellees. 
Moreover, as has been shown above the Citi Appellees failed to prove that they 
did not have timely actual knowledge of Victor's lien action. R.137, 141. The fact 
that § 38-1-11(3) imposes the burden of proof upon Victor to prove at trial that 
Swanson had actual knowledge does not change the nature of a summary judgment 
proceeding which requires, by rule, that the moving party "show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment 
as a matter of law."49 
Recently, the Supreme Court of Utah affirmed the longstanding rule that where 
a non-moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, the party moving for summary 
judgment must nevertheless present evidence to challenge the non-moving party's 
claims and only when the moving party has presented evidence showing that no 
material issue of fact exists on the non-moving party's claims are they then required 
to proffer evidence establishing a material issue of fact: 
49
 See Rule 56(c) Ut. R. Civ. P. 
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"In this case, Kay had the burden of establishing each element of her 
claim that Ray lacked the authority to gift and her claim that Ray 
breached his fiduciary duty. In moving for summary judgment on these 
claims, the stepchildren had 'the burden of presenting evidence to 
demonstrate that no genuine issue of material facts exists and that 
judgment as a matter of law is proper."'50 
Note that in the Eager case even though the Plaintiff Kay had the burden of proof on 
her claim that the gift to the stepchildren was made without authority and in breach 
of a fiduciary duty, in moving for summary judgment the defendant stepchildren had 
the burden of producing evidence which, prima facie entirely negated Kay's claim; 
that is, demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact existed. Accordingly, 
even though at trial Victor has the burden of proof under § 38-1-11(3), this does not 
relieve the Citi Appellees from their summary judgment burden of proffering 
sufficient evidence to prove they had an interest in the liened property and that they 
lacked timely actual knowledge. 
This Court set the same standard for summary judgment in Kleinert v. Kimball 
Elevator Co. where it held that the party defending a summary judgment motion 
"need not prove his or her case before the case may be submitted to the jury."51 The 
Citi Appellees failure to present any evidence showing they had an interest in the 
subject property and their failure to proffer competent evidence to show they lacked 
50
 Eagar v. Burrows, 2008 UT 42,1115. 
51
 854 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
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actual knowledge left Victor's pleadings uncontroverted, meaning that at summary 
judgment Victor was never required to submit evidence sufficient to raise a genuine 
issue of fact. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
The actual knowledge requirement of Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11(2) can only 
be invoked by a person with an interest in the liened property. The Citi Appellees in 
their summary judgment papers entirely defaulted in proving or arguing that they had 
any interest in the subject property. Accordingly, the Citi Appellees had no statutory 
standing to invoke the actual knowledge requirements of § 38-1-11(2). And 
regardless of whether the Citi Appellees has an interest in the subject property, they 
failed to proffer competent evidence showing that they did not have timely actual 
knowledge of the commencement of Victor's lien action. At summary judgment the 
initial burden was on the Citi Appellees to prove they had an interest in the liened 
property and to prove they did not have timely actual knowledge of the 
commencement of the lien action. They failed to carry that burden on both counts. 
Consequently, it was never incumbent upon Victor to proffer evidence opposing the 
Citi Appellees summary judgment motion and the trial court erred in granting the Citi 
Appellees summary judgment. Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18 provides for an award of 
attorney fees to the successful party in a contested lien action and Victor requests an 
award of attorney fees for its enforcement of its lien against the Citi Appellees, both 
34 
before this Court and the court below. 
DATED this 25th day of July, 2008. 
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Tab A 
38-1-11. Enforcement — Time for — Lis pendens — Action 
for debt not affected — Instructions and form 
affidavit and motion. 
(1) A lien claimant shall file an action to enforce the lien filed under this 
chapter within 180 days from the day on which the lien claimant filed a notice 
of claim under Section 38-1-7. 
(2) (a) Within the time period provided for filing in Subsection (1) the lien 
claimant shall file for record with the county recorder of each county in 
which the lien is recorded a notice of the pendency of the action, in the 
manner provided in actions affecting the title or right to possession of real 
property, or the lien shall be void, except as to persons who have been 
made parties to the action and persons having actual knowledge of the 
commencement of the action. 
(b) The burden of proof shall be upon the lien claimant and those 
claiming under the lien claimant to show actual knowledge. 
(3) This section may not be interpreted to impair or affect the right of any 
person to whom a debt may be due for any work done or materials furnished 
to maintain a personal action to recover the same. 
(4) (a) If a lien claimant files an action to enforce a lien filed under this 
chapter involving a residence, as defined in Section 38-11-102, the lien 
claimant shall include with the service of the complaint on the owner of 
the residence: 
(i) instructions to the owner of the residence relating to the owner's 
rights under Title 38; Chapter 11. Residence Lien Restriction and 
Lien Recovery Fund Act; and 
(ii) a form affidavit to enable the owner of the residence to specify 
the grounds upon which the owner may exercise available rights 
under Title 38, Chapter 11, Residence Lien Restriction and Lien 
Recovery Fund Act. 
(b) The instructions and form affidavit required by Subsection (4)(a) 
shall meet the requirements established by rule by the Division of 
Occupational and Professional Licensing in accordance with Title 63, 
Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
(c) If a lien claimant fails to provide to the owner of the residence the 
instructions and form affidavit required by Subsection (4)(a), the lien 
claimant shall be barred from maintaining or enforcing the lien upon the 
residence. 
(d) Judicial determination of the rights and liabilities of the owner of 
the residence under Title 38, Chapters 1 and 11, and Title 14, Chapter 2, 
shall be stayed until after the owner has been given a reasonable period of 
time to establish compliance with Subsections 38-ll-204(4)(a) and (4)(b) 
through an informal proceeding, as set forth in Title 63, Chapter 46b, 
Administrative Procedures Act, commenced within 30 days of the owner 
being served summons in the foreclosure action, at the Division of 
Occupational and Professional Licensing and obtain a certificate of com-
pliance or denial of certificate of compliance, as defined in Section 
38-11-102. 
(e) An owner applying for a certificate of compliance under Subsection 
(4)(d) shall send by certified mail to all lien claimants: 
(i) a copy of the application for a certificate of compliance; and 
(ii) all materials filed in connection with the application. 
(f) The Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing shall notify 
all lien claimants listed in an owner's application for a certificate of 
compliance under Subsection (4)(d) of the issuance or denial of a certificate 
of compliance. 
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1 Judge Steven L. Hansen 
Division 2 
This matter comes before the Court upon Plaintiffs motion to strike the Affidavits of 
Wayne Flynn and Jim Beech; Plaintiffs motion for a new trial on Defendant Citibank and 
Citimortgage's motion for summary judgment; and Plaintiffs motion for a new trial on 
defendant Swanson 's motion for summary judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On January 16, 2007, this Court issued a memorandum decision granting defendants 
CitiMortgage and Citibank Federal Savings Bank's unopposed Motion for Summary 
Judgment. This Court found that because Plaintiffs failed to file a lis pendens in this 
402 
matter and to name Defendants as parties to this lawsuit within 180 days of Plaintiff s 
notice of claim of lien, and because Defendants had no actual knowledge of the lawsuit 
prior to June 2006 (within the 180 day statutory period), the lien was void as to the 
Defendants CitiMortgage and Citibank. 
2. On February 15, 2007, this Court granted defendant Swanson Building Material, Inc.'s 
Motion for Summary Judgment based on the fact that Plaintiff did not name Swanson in 
its initial complaint and failed to do so until nearly two years after recording notice of its 
claim of lien and also because that Plaintiff had failed to meet its statutory burden to 
prove that Swanson had actual knowledge of the lawsuit during the relevant time frame. 
DISCUSSION 
In regard to Plaintiffs motion for a new trial against Defendants CitiMortgage and 
Citibank ("Citi-Defendants"), Plaintiff argues that the Court erred in granting summary judgment 
because the Citi-Defendants provided defective affidavits that are inadmissible that would 
preclude summary judgment. Plaintiff did not oppose the affidavits or the summary judgment 
until the current motion, after summary judgment had already been awarded. 
Plaintiff argues that in the affidavits of Wayne Flynn and Jim Beech, do not show how 
Beech or Flynn were qualified to aver that they knew that the officers and agents of their 
respective businesses had no knowledge of the current litigation. 
Affidavits must meet the standards as set forth in Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Rule 56(e) states that affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth 
2 
such facts as would be admissible in evidence and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is 
competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
In the affidavit of Jim Beech, he swears that he is the president of Direct Mortgage 
Corporation and that he first learned of the existence and pendency of the current litigation at the 
time Direct Mortgage Corporation was served process on June 14, 2006. He further swears, that 
neither he or any other officer or agent of Direct Mortgage Corporation had actual knowledge of 
the existence of the current litigation until June 14, 2006. 
Plaintiff argues that in the case of K&T, Inc. v. Koroulis, 888 P. 2d 623 (Utah 1994), the 
Court found improper a Trial Court's consideration of an affidavit of a secretary on a summary 
judgment where he stated the affidavit in that case of a secretary who claimed that to the best of 
his knowledge neither he nor anyone at his company had actual knowledge of the Consent 
Agreement or the Stockholder's Agreement. 
However, Citi-Defendants argue and this Court agrees that on a motion for summary 
judgment when an opposing party fails to move to strike defective affidavits, he is deemed to 
have waived his opposition to whatever evidentiary defects may exist. See Franklin Financial v. 
New Empire Development Company, 659 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1983). Because Plaintiff failed to 
move to strike defective affidavits on summary judgment they were waived by Plaintiff and were 
properly considered by the Court. 
Rule 56(e) clearly states: 
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When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this 
Rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his 
pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this Rule, 
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he 
does not respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
Because Plaintiff did not object to the affidavits any evidentiary defects are deemed 
waived and the Court takes the affidavits as undisputed fact. Under Rule 56(e) where there is no 
genuine issues of fact that any officer or agent of the Citi-Defendants had knowledge of this 
current litigation, this Court properly granted summary judgment to the Citi-Defendants. 
Therefore, based on the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs motion for a new trial on the Citi 
Defendants' motion for summary judgment is denied. Because the Plaintiff did not move to 
strike the affidavits on motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff may not move to strike the 
affidavits post-judgment, so the Plaintiffs motion to strike affidavits of Wayne Flynn and Jim 
Beech is also denied. 
In regard to Swanson, this Court finds that Swanson was not sent the ruling that was 
issued by the Court on February 15, 2007. This Court finds that Swanson made a good faith 
effort to see if a ruling had been issued when Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial against 
Defendant Swanson, by checking the Court docket. Therefore under Rule 6(b) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure this Court allows and considers Swanson's second memorandum in 
opposition to Plaintiffs motion. 
In Plaintiffs motion for a new trial against Defendant Swanson, Plaintiff argues 5 points: 
1) There is no evidence to support the Court's finding that the defendant Swanson was an 
4 
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interested party; 2) The Court erred in ruling that the lapse of the Defendant Swanson's lien was 
immaterial to the summary judgment issues before this Court; 3) The Court erred in ruling that' 
Defendant Swanson's failure to plead the statute of limitation did not result in a waiver of that 
defense; 4) The Court erred in ruling that the Plaintiffs failure to file a lis pendens within 180 
days of the filing of the mechanic's lien is jurisdictional as opposed to failure to file a legal 
action on the lien within 180 days and; 5) The Court erred in law in reversing the burden of 
production in a summary judgment proceeding requiring the Plaintiff rather than Swanson to 
dispose of the material issue of fact as to whether Swanson had actual knowledge of the 
commencement of the within action. 
On February 3, 2006, Plaintiff amended their complaint stating that all Defendants, "hold 
some claim of right, title, or interest to the aforementioned property and PLAINTIFF alleges that 
all of the claims of right, title or interest of each of theses Defendants and all persons claiming 
by, through, or under them, are junior, inferior, and subject to the prior claims and interest of 
PLAINTIFF, or that the claims, if any, of any other person or entity (Doe Defendants) who may 
assert an interest in the properties should be litigated herein and priorities established." Under 
Baldwin v. Vanatage Corp., 676 P.2d 413, 415 (Utah 1984), "An admission of fact in a pleading 
is a judicial admission and is normally conclusive on the party making it." This Court finds that 
Plaintiff sued Swanson and Plaintiff cannot claim now that Swanson has no interest and standing 
and cannot respond to the complaint. For the same reasons this Court finds it immaterial that 
Swanson's prior lien has lapsed. 
5 
Plaintiff also asserts that because Swanson did not assert the statute of limitations of the 
lien in its answer that Swanson waived its statute of limitations defense. However, this Court 
finds that the statute of limitations does not apply in this case. 
A party failing to comply with §38-1-11 of the mechanics' lien statute is not subject to 
waiver, but is jurisdictional. See Projects Unlimited, Inc. v. Copper State Thrift & Loan Co., 798 
P.2d 738 (1990). 
This Court stands by its two prior rulings. The burden of proof is on the Plaintiff to show 
that the Plaintiff is entitled to the lien and has complied with the lien statute §38-1-11. Both Citi-
Defendants and Swanson filed motions for summary judgment based on the fact that they did not 
have actual knowledge of the current litigation or the lien and that the amended complaint 
naming the Defendants was filed 180 days after the lien was filed. Defendants Swanson and 
Citi-Defendants filed unopposed affidavits stating that no officers or agents at the respective 
businesses had any knowledge of the current litigation. Defendants did not have to prove that 
they had an interest in the property as Plaintiff brought the Defendants into the lawsuit creating 
an affirmative interest. 
Plaintiff attempts to object to the affidavits post-judgment, but that right to objection has 
been waived. Based on the above facts the motion for a new trial with Defendant Swanson is 
denied. 
Defendants to prepare an order consistent with this ruling. 
6 
DATED this Z day of May, 2007. 
Stevefi L. Hansen 
District Court Judge 
Case No. 040401255 
A certificate of mailing is on the following page. 
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Darci D. Tolbert 
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901 West Baker Drive 
South Jordan, Utah 84095 
Attorneys for Defendant Citimortgage, Inc and Citibank Federal Savings Bank 
Leslie Van Frank 
Matthew G. Bagley 
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Division 2 
This matter comes before the Court upon Plaintiffs motion to strike the Affidavits of 
Wayne Flynn and Jim Beech; Plaintiffs motion for a new trial on Defendant Citibank and 
Citimortgage's motion for summary judgment; and Plaintiffs motion for a new trial on 
Defendant Swanson 's motion for summary judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On January 16, 2007, this Court issued a memorandum decision granting defendants 
CitiMortgage and Citibank Federal Savings Bank's unopposed Motion for Summary 
Judgment. This Court found that because Plaintiffs failed to file a lis pendens in this 
402 
matter and to name Defendants as parties to this lawsuit within 180 days of Plaintiff s 
notice of claim of lien, and because Defendants had no actual knowledge of the lawsuit 
prior to June 2006 (within the 180 day statutory period), the lien was void as to the 
Defendants CitiMortgage and Citibank. 
2. On February 15, 2007, this Court granted defendant Swanson Building Material, Inc.'s 
Motion for Summary Judgment based on the fact that Plaintiff did not name Swanson in 
its initial complaint and failed to do so until nearly two years after recording notice of its 
claim of lien and also because that Plaintiff had failed to meet its statutory burden to 
prove that Swanson had actual knowledge of the lawsuit during the relevant time frame. 
DISCUSSION 
In regard to Plaintiffs motion for a new trial against Defendants CitiMortgage and 
Citibank ("Citi-Defendants"), Plaintiff argues that the Court erred in granting summary judgment 
because the Citi-Defendants provided defective affidavits that are inadmissible that would 
preclude summary judgment. Plaintiff did not oppose the affidavits or the summary judgment 
until the current motion, after summary judgment had already been awarded. 
Plaintiff argues that in the affidavits of Wayne Flynn and Jim Beech, do not show how 
Beech or Flynn were qualified to aver that they knew that the officers and agents of their 
respective businesses had no knowledge of the current litigation. 
Affidavits must meet the standards as set forth in Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Rule 56(e) states that affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth 
2 
such facts as would be admissible in evidence and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is 
competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
In the affidavit of Jim Beech, he swears that he is the president of Direct Mortgage 
Corporation and that he first learned of the existence and pendency of the current litigation at the 
time Direct Mortgage Corporation was served process on June 14, 2006. He further swears, that 
neither he or any other officer or agent of Direct Mortgage Corporation had actual knowledge of 
the existence of the current litigation until June 14, 2006. 
Plaintiff argues that in the case of K&T. Inc. v. Koroulis, 888 P. 2d 623 (Utah 1994), the 
Court found improper a Trial Court's consideration of an affidavit of a secretary on a summary 
judgment where he stated the affidavit in that case of a secretary who claimed that to the best of 
his knowledge neither he nor anyone at his company had actual knowledge of the Consent 
Agreement or the Stockholder's Agreement. 
However, Citi-Defendants argue and this Court agrees that on a motion for summary 
judgment when an opposing party fails to move to strike defective affidavits, he is deemed to 
have waived his opposition to whatever evidentiary defects may exist. See Franklin Financial v. 
New Empire Development Company. 659 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1983). Because Plaintiff failed to 
move to strike defective affidavits on summary judgment they were waived by Plaintiff and were 
properly considered by the Court. 
Rule 56(e) clearly states: 
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When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this 
Rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his 
pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this Rule, 
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he 
does not respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
Because Plaintiff did not object to the affidavits any evidentiary defects are deemed 
waived and the Court takes the affidavits as undisputed fact. Under Rule 56(e) where there is no 
genuine issues of fact that any officer or agent of the Citi-Defendants had knowledge of this 
current litigation, this Court properly granted summary judgment to the Citi-Defendants. 
Therefore, based on the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs motion for a new trial on the Citi 
Defendants' motion for summary judgment is denied. Because the Plaintiff did not move to 
strike the affidavits on motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff may not move to strike the 
affidavits post-judgment, so the Plaintiffs motion to strike affidavits of Wayne Flynn and Jim 
Beech is also denied. 
In regard to Swanson, this Court finds that Swanson was not sent the ruling that was 
issued by the Court on February 15, 2007. This Court finds that Swanson made a good faith 
effort to see if a ruling had been issued when Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial against 
Defendant Swanson, by checking the Court docket. Therefore under Rule 6(b) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure this Court allows and considers Swanson's second memorandum in 
opposition to Plaintiffs motion. 
In Plaintiffs motion for a new trial against Defendant Swanson, Plaintiff argues 5 points: 
1) There is no evidence to support the Court's finding that the defendant Swanson was an 
4 
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interested party; 2) The Court erred in ruling that the lapse of the Defendant Swanson's lien was 
immaterial to the summary judgment issues before this Court; 3) The Court erred in ruling that 
Defendant Swanson's failure to plead the statute of limitation did not result in a waiver of that 
defense; 4) The Court erred in ruling that the Plaintiffs failure to file a lis pendens within 180 
days of the filing of the mechanic's lien is jurisdictional as opposed to failure to file a legal 
action on the lien within 180 days and; 5) The Court erred in law in reversing the burden of 
production in a summary judgment proceeding requiring the Plaintiff rather than Swanson to 
dispose of the material issue of fact as to whether Swanson had actual knowledge of the 
commencement of the within action. 
On February 3, 2006, Plaintiff amended their complaint stating that all Defendants, "hold 
some claim of right, title, or interest to the aforementioned property and PLAINTIFF alleges that 
all of the claims of right, title or interest of each of theses Defendants and all persons claiming 
by, through, or under them, are junior, inferior, and subject to the prior claims and interest of 
PLAINTIFF, or that the claims, if any, of any other person or entity (Doe Defendants) who may 
assert an interest in the properties should be litigated herein and priorities established." Under 
Baldwin v. Vanatage Corp., 676 P.2d 413, 415 (Utah 1984), "An admission of fact in a pleading 
is a judicial admission and is normally conclusive on the party making it." This Court finds that 
Plaintiff sued Swanson and Plaintiff cannot claim now that Swanson has no interest and standing 
and cannot respond to the complaint. For the same reasons this Court finds it immaterial that 
Swanson's prior lien has lapsed. 
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Plaintiff also asserts that because Swanson did not assert the statute of limitations of the 
lien in its answer that Swanson waived its statute of limitations defense. However, this Court 
finds that the statute of limitations does not apply in this case. 
A party failing to comply with §38-1-11 of the mechanics' lien statute is not subject to 
waiver, but is jurisdictional. See Projects Unlimited, Inc. v. Copper State Thrift & Loan Co., 798 
P.2d 738 (1990). 
This Court stands by its two prior rulings. The burden of proof is on the Plaintiff to show 
that the Plaintiff is entitled to the lien and has complied with the lien statute §38-1-11. Both Citi-
Defendants and Swanson filed motions for summary judgment based on the fact that they did not 
have actual knowledge of the current litigation or the lien and that the amended complaint 
naming the Defendants was filed 180 days after the lien was filed. Defendants Swanson and 
Citi-Defendants filed unopposed affidavits stating that no officers or agents at the respective 
businesses had any knowledge of the current litigation. Defendants did not have to prove that 
they had an interest in the property as Plaintiff brought the Defendants into the lawsuit creating 
an affirmative interest. 
Plaintiff attempts to object to the affidavits post-judgment, but that right to objection has 
been waived. Based on the above facts the motion for a new trial with Defendant Swanson is 
denied. 
Defendants to prepare an order consistent with this ruling. 
6 
DATED this £ ft . day of May, 2007. 
Case No. 040401255 
A certificate of mailing is on the following page. 
Steven L. Hansen 
District Court Judge 
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